Washington and his troops at Fort Necessity were challenged by the poor location of the fort and by

The Seven Years’ War, known in America as the French and Indian War, was a conflict between the French and British for control of the western frontier of the American colonies. Both countries claimed the territory in the Ohio River Valley and were willing to fight for the confluence of rivers that would place them in command of westward expansion. In 1753, a young, näive colonial George Washington, desperately wanting to be a British officer and man of prominence, accepted a commission as a British emissary to the French. This experience was the beginning of his involvement in the events that occurred in Western Pennsylvania which initiated “the first of the modern world wars.”1 Washington’s confrontations with the French and Indians at Jumonville, Fort Necessity, and Braddock’s Field marked the beginning of his journey toward decisive leadership. By tracing his often-overlooked early career, one may see how Washington went from incompetence and near disaster to bold and successful leadership of our country. Washington was not born a great leader but he developed his skills through his struggles to overcome inexperience and mistakes on the early battlefields of the French and Indian War. 

In the colonial era, the Ohio River Valley, the region in whichpresent-day Pittsburgh is located, was a cause of great conflict between the French, the British, and the Indians. In this lush valley, the Allegheny and Monongahela rivers come together to form the Ohio River, the important waterway to the west. The possessor of the forks of the Ohio would command the western frontier.The French established forts in Canada and western Pennsylvania to protect their empire and to facilitate trade with the Indians. France believed that the territory surrounding the confluence belonged to her, as did the rivers which, via the French Creek, formed a connection to French land along the Mississippi River.2 On the other hand, the British believed their claim to this region was primary. They had already settled the eastern coastal territories of North America and desired to expand settlement westward to accommodate growth. The British and the French had common aspirations for a larger empire but “the two nations also shared something else; a history of war and bloodshed dating back centuries.”3 Their common ambition and long-standing animosity are the origins of their conflict in western Pennsylvania.

On February 22, 1732, a son, George, was born to Augustine Washington, a Virginia farmer, and his second wife, Mary Ball. During his youth, his “schooling had been haphazard,” and most of what he knew was from reading.4 His father already had two sons from his previous marriage and, unfortunately for George, they inherited his father’s estate when George was ten. Not wanting to live the life of a modest farmer, he decided to make something better for himself: “He had always been, and would always remain, an eager self-improver.”5 At age fifteen, he became a surveyor of farmland with the help of his father’s instruments.6 When his brother Lawrence married the daughter of George Fairfax in 1743, he was offered a position as a surveyor of the Shenandoah Valley. As a result, Washington became familiar with part of the territory through which he would eventually march. Later, he joined the military and became an Adjutant General of Virginia with the rank of major. The historian Peter Henriques comments, “Washington’s desire for official British rank and his efforts to obtain it bordered on obsessive...how different history might have been had he achieved his goal"7 He dreamed of “public recognition, reputation and fame,”8 and decided to risk his life to achieve this dream. 

In 1753, Virginia’s Governor Robert Dinwiddie decided to send an ultimatum to the French for encroaching on Virginia’s territory. The young Washington was offered a commission as emissary to lead an expedition to Fort Le Boeuf, near Lake Erie. He was instructed to deliver a letter to the commander demanding that the French leave Virginia’s territory. It should be noted that Virginia was claiming territory that was directly west of Pennsylvania, not Virginia, because Pennsylvania was governed by Quakers, who did not believe in fighting but would permit others to do so. When Washington traveled to the western frontier of the colonies, his party included the interpreter Dutchman Jacob van Braam, the scout Christopher Gist, Tanacharison, a Seneca chief who had been designated as the Half King for the territory, his group of Indians, and four other frontiersmen.9 When they passed through the Ohio River Valley, although Washington “had none of the expertise in military engineering to which he was pretending, as his mistakes in the coming year would amply demonstrate,”10 he could appreciate that “the forks of the Ohio would indeed furnish an ideal site for a fort with the entire command of the Monongahela.”11 He informed his superiors in Virginia of this discovery, and, according to the historian Seymour Schwartz, “It was at Washington’s suggestion that the building of Fort George, which would become Fort Duquesne and eventually Fort Pitt, was initiated at this site.”12 

Most who know about Washington’s journey may remember that his Indian guide suddenly fired at him but luckily missed, or that when he was crossing the partially frozen Allegheny, he fell into the river from his makeshift raft and was forced to spend the night on an island. However, there is much more involved than legends suggest. After traveling through wilderness which was nearly unknown and inhabited primarily by Indians,13 he and his party continued northward to Fort Venango where they were greeted by Frenchman Philippe Thomas de Joncaire, who told them that they still had sixty-five more miles to go.14 Washingtonwrote of Joncaire’s hospitality,“He invited us to sup with them, and treated us with the greatest complaisance.”15 The conduct of the French during these first encounters is in sharp contrast with Washington’s later treatment of the French commander Jumonville and his men. After dinner and a few drinks, Washington learned more about their intentions. He wrote, “They told me it was their absolute design to take possession of the Ohio, and by God they would do it.”16 Washington left the fort with this knowledge of the French plans. 

When they finally arrived at Fort Le Boeuf, located near the base of French Creek, Washington was given another “glimpse of just how serious the French were about seizing and holding the Ohio Country.”17 The impressive fort and multitude of canoes revealed that the French were indeed preparing for battle. Washington was taken to the French commander, Captain Legardeur de St. Pierre. He presented Governor Dinwiddie’s letter but the Captain wanted his own translator.18 The translation revealed the “direct demand for the ‘peaceful departure’ of all the French from the Ohio,”19 which the British claimed as their territory. Two days later, a time which Washington spent observing the fort and the capabilities of the French, a reply was returned to him: “As to the summons you sent me to retire, I do not think myself obliged to obey it.”20 The response, “For all its courteous tone...was a declaration of open war—if the English desired it—on the Ohio.”21 Young Washington knew that delivery of this message to Governor Dinwiddie would initiate a war. 

Captain St. Pierre wanted the Half King to remain with the French and lured him with promises and gifts. When Washington learned of this treachery “there appeared the first glimpse of tempered steel in the character of the young militiaman.”22 Washington refused to leave without him, confronted the captain and then ordered the Half King to depart with his group. The Half King, “instead of being angered...appeared to be impressed by Washington’s spunk.”23 Washington then returned to Virginia and delivered the French response to Governor Dinwiddie.  

Because it was clear that a war was brewing, the following spring the Governor decided to put Washington in command of a few hundred men and to send him to the forks to finish the fort that the Ohio Company had started.24 Washington had a very difficult time recruiting men and finding supplies, but he could not be distracted from his goal of rising through the British ranks.25 Washington was promoted to a lieutenant colonel, two companies were formed with 132 men and the expedition to the forks took place.26 Because of his previous duties as a surveyor of the Shenandoah Valley, he was acquainted with part of the area through which they would travel. Although he did not have any real experience with the frontier, he did have “a burning ambition for recognition.”27 Meanwhile, a French force led by Captain Contrecoeur had traveled down the Allegheny in their canoes and seized the beginnings of the English fort at the forks from Ensign Ward, who had been directing its construction.28 The French began their own fort, which they named Fort Duquesne. Washington was informed of this loss upon reaching the Allegheny Mountains. He and his shabby recruits continued westward towards Red Stone Creek where there was a fortified store that belonged to the Ohio Company.29 Following his ambition and ignoring his inexperience, he decided to continue despite the overwhelming odds against him. 

Washington reached the Great Meadows, which were about halfway to Red Stone Creek. “To his näive eyes,” the “two natural entrenchments,”30 the stream, and the grasses for the animals31 seemed like a perfect place for a fort and a “charming field for an encounter.”32 He failed to see the contrast between this site and that of the forks of the Ohio, not realizing that the low ground was vulnerable to floods and to attack by enemies on the surrounding high ground. It was a very poor choice for a fort, a mistake that Washington would later regret. As preparations were being made, Gist came to report that French militia had passed his house on the previous day, and were marching towards Washington’s encampment.33 They had recently passed Gist’s house. In response, he hastily sent a large group of men to find the French. When he later received a message from the Half King that the French were seven miles away he realized that he had made a mistake by sending “half his troops off in the wrong direction.”34 With his remaining troops, he set off to find the Half King who would lead him to the French. When he reached the Indian, he wrote, “We concluded to attack them together,”35 although he later claimed that the Indians acted independently of his command. 

The French were encamped in a glen, which Washington’s forces and the Indians easily surrounded, looking down “on the unguarded, unsuspecting enemy camp.”36 Washington used a strategy for the first time in this battle that “was to remain through the early years of the Revolution his favorite method of attack: he dispatched several columns along different routes.”37 He hastily, and carelessly, attacked after the French discovered his troops, shedding the first blood of the French and Indian War. “I heard the bullets whistle, and, believe me, there is something charming in the sound” he later wrote to his brother regarding his first battle,38 revealing not only the courage of the legendary man, even as a youth, but also his näivete: he did not truly understand the severe consequences of this first battle, thinking only that perhaps it would enhance his reputation among the British. 

The French tried to surrender but the Indians began to scalp the wounded before Washington could accept their pleas. After the confusion ended, he discovered that there were over twenty prisoners and ten dead. One of those who had been killed was the French commander Joseph Coulon de Villiers de Jumonville. The survivors frantically had been trying to explain something which was understood only after the battle: “They were carrying a message...from the government of France.”39 Washington realized that they were accusing him of the murder of diplomatic emissaries on a mission to warn his troops to leave French territory,40 just as he had done only months before at Fort Le Boeuf. The difference was that while Washington had been received amicably, the French emissaries had been attacked without mercy. Most believe the stories depicting Washington’s civil nature. Therefore, because the attack was ruthless, his involvement in this event is generally overlooked. 

There is much controversy surrounding the Jumonville Affair because, although it may be true that the French had in fact been envoys, their orders also contained instructions to Jumonville “to keep his commander informed on British positions and actions.”41 Of course, this is exactly what Washington had done at Fort Venango and Fort Le Boeuf. To dispel charges of assassination and to hide his mistakes from Dinwiddie, Washington not only argued that the latter was true, but also that the number of troops and their failure to make themselves known to him disproved the accusation.42 He claimed that they “had intended to use whichever set [of instructions] best suited the circumstances.”43 He ignored the fact that the French had peaceably passed Gist’s house the previous day. Washington even demonstrated hypocrisy when he tried to blame the attack on the Indian allies who accompanied him, despite his previous statement that they had decided to work together: “This little skirmish...was by the Half King and the Indians. We were auxiliaries to them...”44 Meanwhile, the French reported that the attack was “barbaric, contrary to every principle of international relations.”45 Because of his inexperience, Washington did not understand the effect of politics on military strategy. Horace Walpole, a British statesman, later wrote that “The volley fired by a young Virginian in the backwoods of America set the world on fire.”46 The beginning of a war was the largest ramification of his mistakes in this battle. 

Washington expected that the French would try to avenge the death of Jumonville. He decided to finish the fort at the Great Meadows, appropriately naming it Fort Necessity. He näively wrote that when in the fort, “with my small numbers, I shall not fear the attack of 500 men.”47 The Half King warned him of the danger, urging that “the middle of a field was not the perfect spot for a fortification,”48 but Washington stubbornly refused the advice of this experienced man. He demonstrated this stubbornness in his views of the British officers as well. Colonel Fry, who was in command of the Virginia regiment, was on his way to reinforce Washington. His death led to Washington’s promotion to colonel. Washington would be in full command until Colonel James Innes arrived with reinforcements and assumed command himself.  Washington wrote to Governor Dinwiddie that he wanted to have an experienced officer to serve under, but he was “unwilling to have his authority questioned in a manner he felt insulting to himself and to Virginia.”49 Captain James Mackey would be the first to reach Fort Necessity and the first to “insult” Washington by telling him that “since any royal commission outranked all colonial ones, whenever matters involved both the Virginia regiment and [Mackey’s] company, he would give the orders.”50 This not only increased Washington’s determination to receive a British commission, but also may have been the genesis of Washington’s difficulties accepting British authority before the Revolution. In his polite response, which is appropriate to his character as it is presented today, he explained “that it was obviously improper for a South Carolina captain to give orders to a Virginia regiment.”51 

Washington and some of his troops were at Gist’s trading station on their way to the Redstone Creek when they were given a message from the Indians that the French had been reinforced and were sending troops to attack Washington. Although he initially wanted to transform the trading post into a stockade, he instead took the advice of the Indians to return to the fort where they would be closer to their supplies. They began the hard, mountainous journey to the fort, without proper means of transportation for their ammunition.52Washington, whose subsequently celebrated polite nature reflects this gesture, “set an example to his officers by giving up his riding horse to carry munitions.”53 Later he ignored the further advice of the Half King, who tried to convince him to return to Fort Cumberland. When he refused because he thought his men were too exhausted, the Indians deserted him. The Half King believed that, though good-natured, Washington’s inexperience caused him to “command the Indians as his slaves.”54 In this way, Washington’s lack of leadership skills, mistakes and miscalculations deprived him of Indian allies during the battle of Fort Necessity. 

To their astonishment, when they reached the Fort, the reinforcements and supplies which had supposedly been sent to them had not arrived.55 After observing the condition of his men, Washington realized that it would be unwise to march any furtherand decided to remain at the fort despite the formidable shortage of supplies. More troops were apparently on the way and they hurried to finish the fort. When the French arrived, led by the brother of Jumonville, Captain Louis Coulon de Villiers, the troops fired, and it seemed at first as though his men had an advantage. But the French attack continued and Washington realized his mistake: the fort was an easy target from the surrounding woods. In addition, when it began to rain that afternoon, the fort’s location on low ground became detrimental.56 Washington’s miscalculations had left him in a fort that was vulnerable to both gunfire and floods. When the French eventually decided to offer Washington terms of surrender, he accepted them after much internal debate. He later reflected, “In this situation and no prospt. of bettering it terms of capitulation were offered to us by the enemy.”57 Washington knew that if they continued to fight and somehow managed to win, which was unlikely, he could not remain in the fort without food; nor could he leave the wounded behind.58 

To Washington’s surprise, the French offered very lenient surrender terms. The defeated troops could leave Fort Necessity freely, and “Washington was too pleased, too young, too inexperienced to wonder why.”59 He was satisfied to have escaped alive from the dangerous situation that resulted from his mistakes. At the time, he did not realize that the document he had signed not only defined the terms of surrender, but also contained in a preamble an admission written in French that Washington and his men had assassinated Jumonville. The terms stated that although Washington and his men would be permitted to leave, they could “not work on any establishment either in the surrounding country or beyond the mountains during one year beginning from this day.”60 However, the following year he would break his promise by returning to Western Pennsylvania. When these written terms of surrender were later published, they began an international controversy.61 

Washington’s career was affected by this event as well as “the long-range development of his character and military skill.”62 Overall, on this campaign he had failed miserably in his position as commander. He had lost the trust of the Indians, had been easily defeated by the French, and had admitted to an assassination. The historian Flexner writes, “Militarily, Washington had shown both foolhardiness and ignorance. His marching without waiting for reinforcements or the experienced commander he craved...showed much more bravery than good judgment.”63 After these mistakes, Washington’s reputation among British officers was tainted and his name “became synonymous with the long-assumed incompetence of Colonial military officers.”64 Curiously, because French losses had been exaggerated, Washington and his men were viewed as heroic by those on the western frontier who believed they had fought bravely against a larger force.65 According to park ranger, historian, and French and Indian War reenactor Herb Clevenger, “The country was so new...[that] they became instant heroes.”66 This led to a myth surrounding the events. Fortunately for our country, “Brashness, greenness, all the concomitants of inexperience may be outgrown, and Washington had exhibited to a superlative degree a quality that is inborn: the ability to lead men.”67 

Defeated, with his dreams of becoming a commissioned regular British officer shattered, Washington returned to Virginia and resigned from the military. It is an open question whether the resignation was caused by the embarrassment which he had brought upon himself or whether it was because of “an order issued...limiting the authority of Colonial officers” such as himself.68 He later indicated that the order “was too degrading for [him] to submit to.”69 But, in 1755, Washington was convinced by General Edward Braddock to serve as his aide-de-camp on a campaign to avenge the British loss by seizing Fort Duquesne, a victory which Braddock was absolutely confident they would achieve. Braddock assumed that the abilities of his organized and disciplined troops were greatly superior to those of the enemy, but he severely underestimated the determination and tactics of the French and their Indian allies. The French realized the importance of their position at the forks: “Fort Duquesne was not merely another outpost...it had been singled out as a focal point of empire.”70 They did not plan to lose their control of the forks of the Ohio and were prepared to fight. 

After much persuasion by Braddock, Washington reluctantly agreed to return to the theater of war. The General believed that the young colonel would “profit from...participating in a full scale campaign,”71 especially one lead by an experienced man such as himself. Washington, who had realized his limitations and inexperience after Fort Necessity, decided that it would benefit him to take military lessons from a master, and perhaps hoped the opportunity would allow him to regain his reputation as well. Little did he know that the primary lesson he would learn was that the established European method of fighting was of little value when opposed by the tactics of the French and Indians. This lesson proved to be invaluable to him twenty years later during the Revolutionary War because the British military would fail to learn from their mistakes in the current conflict.

Traveling on the same route as in the previous expedition, when the troops reached the general vicinity of Jumonville Glen, Braddock decided, on the advice of Washington, to leave a portion of the army and most of the supplies under the protection of Colonel Thomas Dunbar. He could then continue on to Duquesne with a smaller force, called a “flying column.”72 Illness prevented Washington from traveling as a part of the main body of the army.73 Despite the potential danger, Washington later decided to join the advance column, perhaps to prove his courage or to make sure he was present at the taking of Fort Duquesne, which everyone assumed would be a glorious victory for the British.

General Braddock sent scouts to determine the best route to the forks. When he was informed that a deep ravine, through which Turtle Creek runs, would greatly hinder their progress, Braddock concluded that it would be best to cross the Monongahela and travel up the flat side, bypassing the ravine.74 When Braddock and his forces, including Washington, reached the other side after a second crossing and entered the woods, they were suddenly attacked by the enemy. Their first round of fire pushed back the French and the Indians, whom the British outnumbered, and the French commander Beaujeu was killed.75 However, the French, whose strategy was to engage the British before they reached Fort Duquesne, regrouped to attack again, just as they had at Fort Necessity. 

The British troops, most of whom were regulars in the British army, not colonists, began to panic. “When an eyewitness observes panic, he knows it.”76 and Washington, despite his inexperience, realized something terrible was wrong when he saw that the troops “were so disconcerted and confused as soon to fall into irretrievable disorder.”77 The French were using Indian battle tactics and their possession of the higher ground to ambush a superior, trained force. Although Washington had already witnessed this method of fighting from behind the cover of trees in the battle at Fort Necessity, he had not fully understood its effectiveness against a superior force until this day. At Fort Necessity, he could see only that the enemy was firing from the distant woods on higher ground. But here, he saw that this warfare was effective even at close range, especially against an army in ordered formation. Washington learned from these observations of the enemy and reflected in his journal, “The folly and consequence of opposing compact bodies to the sparse manner of Indian fighting, in woods...was now so clearly verified that from hence forward another mode obtained in all future operations.”78 Washington also gained from his experience in this battle that the British army, despite its reputation as one of the strongest armies in the world, was not invincible. These implications “were to affect profoundly the last years of our pre-Revolutionary era.”79 This knowledge would later be significant to him in his role as the commander of the Continental army in the Revolutionary War, but Washington was not the only one to receive this impression of the British following the battle. Benjamin Franklin remarked, “This whole transaction gave us Americans the first Suspicion that our exalted Ideas of the Prowess of British Regulars had not been well founded.”80 Thus, the origin of the strategic ideas that were the foundation of the Revolutionary War may have evolved from the assessments of this defeat. 

Panic overwhelmed the confidence among the troops and the British finally began to retreat. Often forgotten is the reason the Indians did not directly cross the Turtle Creek gorge and outflank the retreating army. “So anxious were the Indians to reap the harvest on this field of blood” and so afraid were the French that they would encounter British reinforcements that they did not follow the remnants of the army which they had just defeated.81 Having suffered around one thousand casualties,82 including the mortal wound of General Braddock, the British fled towards the camp near Fort Necessity and then almost immediately began their journey back to Virginia rather than forming a counter attack.83 They left the entire western frontier of Virginia open to French and Indian attack via the very road Braddock had painstakingly cut into the wilderness.84 

When Braddock died, Washington took command of the retreating army, and the events of the battle “marked the beginning of the legend of George Washington as a great colonial military leader.”85 It is Washington, not Braddock, who “achieved lasting fame for the valor he displayed in the heat of the battle.”86 The legend surrounding this battle is that Washington had several horses shot out from under him and that he had bullet holes in his clothing and hat, but that he survived nevertheless.87 Though these observations may or may not be true, this is all that most remember about Washington’s involvement in the war for the western frontier, and these images of unyielding strength allowed him to regain and even enhance his reputation. Fortunately for his career, his mistakes at Jumonville Glen and Fort Necessity were forgotten. Although the experience allowed him to become well-known in the military and political arenas of the colonies, it also taught him a great deal about successful military tactics and leadership which prepared him for his later command in the Revolutionary War. In the western frontier of the colonies, “on the banks of the Monongahela were born myths that would mature with the idea of independence.”88 

Voltaire wrote about the early events of the war, “Such was the complication of political interests that a cannon shot fired in America could give the signal that set Europe in a blaze.”89 The conflicts created a world war in which France eventually lost her command of the western frontier. The immense expenses of the war lead to harsh British taxation of the colonies and “some people began to dream of independence.”90 Washington, who had been involved in these early battles, had gathered much knowledge which was critical for his later work in achieving independence.

By examining the early events of the French and Indian War, one can conclude that the experience and knowledge which Washington gained through his involvement greatly influenced his later role as a leader of the American Colonies. However, this early career is often overlooked in the final judgment of his character. At the root of Washington’s celebrated morality and dignity were the näivete and inexperience of youth, and a driving ambition for personal greatness. Beginning on his journey to Fort Le Boeuf as an emissary, Washington made numerous mistakes that not only affected his reputation but his future as a leader as well. However, the disasters for the British army at Jumonville Glen, Fort Necessity and along the Monongahela that jeopardized their control over the forks ofthe Ohio shaped Washington’s character and prepared him for his effective command in the Revolutionary War. Contrary to the myth that surrounds him as the Commander of the Continental army and first President of the United States, the young Washington of course had flaws and lapses of judgment during the French and Indian War; but he learned from both his own limitations and inexperience and became a great leader. As the historian Alberts wrote, “Having experienced failure, frustration, and defeat in the frontier war of 1754-1758, he was admirably prepared to cope with the problems he faced for 21 years as a national leader in war, politics, and international affairs.”91

The widely accepted image of Washington as rendered in paintings and sculptures does not reflect his long journey to achieve the greatness for which he is revered. The admirable qualities which he seemed to possess during the Revolutionary War and his presidency were characteristics that he acquired as a result of his experiences in Western Pennsylvania during the early years of the French and Indian War. He was not born an accomplished military strategist or decisive leader, as some may believe. Instead he progressed from the näivete of a young soldier vying for British rank to the most prominent and distinguished figure in American history: a man of granite.

1 Seymour I. Schwartz, The French and Indian War: The Imperial Struggle for North America (New York: Castle, 1994) p. 1

2 George Irvin, The Art of Robert Griffing: His Journey into the Eastern Frontier (Gibsonia: East/West Visions, 2000) p. 72 

3 Ibid., p. 72 

4 Fred Anderson, Crucible of War (New York: Knopf, 2000) 

p. 42 

5 Ibid., p. 42 

6 Thomas A. Lewis, For King and Country (New York: Harper Collins, 1993) p. 7 

7 Peter R. Henriques, America’s First President: George Washington (n.p.: Eastern National, 2002) n. pag 

8 Anderson, p. 43 

9 Walter O’Meara, Guns at the Forks (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 1979) p. 3 

10 Lewis, p. 74 

11 Anderson, p. 43 

12 Schwartz, p. 9 

13 John Marshall, The Life of George Washington Vol. II (Fredericksburg: The Citizen’s Guild, 1926) p. 4 

14 Ibid., p. 109 

15 Ibid., p. 87 

16 Ibid., p. 110 

17 O’Meara, p. 6 

18 Lewis, p. 112 

19 O’Meara, p. 7 

20 Robert C. Alberts, A Charming Field for an Encounter (Washington: Eastern National, 1975) p. 7
21 O’Meara, p. 33 

22 Lewis, p. 113 

23 Ibid., p.113 

24 Ibid., p. 126 

25 Lewis, p. 28 

26 Alberts, p. 3 

27 Ibid., p. 5 

28 Anderson, p. 47 

29 Ibid., p. 51 

30 James Thomas Flexner, George Washington: The Forge of Experience (1732-1775) (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1965) p. 86 

31 Anderson, p. 52 

32 Flexner, p. 86 

33 Ibid., p. 87

34 Anderson, p. 53 

35 Flexner, p. 88 

36 Alberts, p. 17 

37 Flexner, p. 88 

38 Ibid., p. 89 

39 Lewis, p. 143 

40 Flexner, p. 90 

41 Ibid., p. 90 

42 Ibid., p. 90 

43 Alberts, p. 19 

44 Ibid., p. 20 

45 Lewis, p. 144 

46 Fort Necessity: Jumonville Glen (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1995) no page 

47 Flexner, p. 93 

48 Ibid., p. 94 

49 Ibid., p. 94 

50 Ibid., p. 95 

51 Alberts, p. 27 

52 Ibid., p. 29 

53 Flexner, p. 100 

54 Ibid., p. 100 

55 Alberts, p. 29 

56 Flexner, p. 102 

57 “Biographical Memorandum,” Electronic Text Center University of Virginia, 12 March 2003 <http:// etext.lib.virginia.edu/toc/modeng/public/WasFi29.html> 

58 Flexner, p. 103 

59 Ibid., p. 104 

60 Alberts, p. 37 

61 Flexner, p. 105 

62 Ibid., p. 106 

63 Ibid., p. 107 

64 Ibid., p. 108 

65 Ibid., p. 108 

66 Herb Clevenger, personal interview, 23 February 3003 

67 Flexner, p. 108 

68 Paul E. Kopperman, Braddock at the Monongahela (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 1977) p. 42 

69 “Biographical” 

70 Kopperman, p. 19 

71 Ibid., p. 42 

72 Irvin, p. 79 

73 Kopperman, p. 44 

74 Irvin, p. 82 

75 Ibid., p. 82 

76 Kopperman, p. 70 

77 “Biographical” 

78 Ibid., n. pag. 

79 Kopperman, p. xi 

80 “Three Major Reasons for the Importance of the Battle of Braddock’s Field,” Braddock’s Field Historical Society, Braddock Library: n. d., n. pag. 

81 George P. Donehoo, Pennsylvania: A History (New York: Lewis, 1926) p. 746 

82 Irvin, p. 83 

83 Ibid., p. 83 

84 “Biographical” 

85 “Three,” no page 

86 Kopperman, p. xi 

87 Irvin, p. 83 

88 Kopperman., p. xi 

89 Flexner, p. 92 

90 Fort, no page 

91 Alberts, p. 56

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alberts, Robert C., A Charming Field for an Encounter Washington: Eastern National, 1975 

Anderson, Fred, Crucible of War New York: Knopf, 2000 
“Biographical Memorandum,” Electronic Text Center University of Virginia Library. 12 March 2003 <http// etext.lib.virginia.edu/toc/modeng/public/WasFi29.html> 

Clevenger, Herb, Personal Interview, 23 February 2003 

Donehoo, George P., Pennsylvania: A History New York: Lewis, 1926 

Flexner, James Thomas, George Washington: The Forge of Experience (1732-1775) Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1965 

Fort Necessity: Jumonville Glen n. p.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1995 

Henriques, Peter R., America’s First President: George Washington n. p.: Eastern National, 2002 

Irvin, George, The Art of Robert Griffing: His Journey into the Eastern Frontier Gibsonia: East/West Visions, 2000 

Kopperman, Paul E., Braddock at the Monongahela Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 1977 

Lewis, Thomas A., For King and Country New York: Harper Collins, 1993 

Marshall, John, The Life of George Washington Vol. II. Fredericksburg: The Citizen’s Guild, 1926 

O’Meara, Walter, Guns at the Forks Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 1979 

Schwartz, Seymour I., The French and Indian War: The Imperial Struggle for North America New York: Castle, 1994 

“Three Major Reasons for the Importance of the Battle of Braddock’s Field,” Braddock’s Field Historical Society Braddock Library: no page, no date 

Anderson, Fred, “Re: The Writings of George Washington,” E-mail to the author, 9 January 2003 

Belser, Ann, “Braddock Battle Lines: Historical Group Acquires Rare Account of Massacre,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette East Pittsburgh: Wednesday, 8 January 2003, no page 

Sallinger, David, “Historians Gear up to Mark Braddock’s Anniversary,” The Daily News McKeesport: 6 July 1995, no page

Smith, Francine L., Personal Interview, 1 March 2003

Trudel, Marcel, The Jumonville Affair 1954, no page, Eastern National, 2002 

What was the name of the fort that George Washington built to challenge the French but was ultimately defeated?

What problems did George Washington face at Fort Necessity?

What happened to Washington at Fort Necessity?

Was George Washington defeated at Fort Necessity?