Which types of detection methods are employed by network intrusion detection systems NIDS )?

NIDS and NIPS

A network-based intrusion detection system (NIDS) detects malicious traffic on a network. NIDS usually require promiscuous network access in order to analyze all traffic, including all unicast traffic. NIDS are passive devices that do not interfere with the traffic they monitor; Fig. 7.2 shows a typical NIDS architecture. The NIDS sniffs the internal interface of the firewall in read-only mode and sends alerts to a NIDS Management server via a different (ie, read/write) network interface.

The difference between a NIDS and a NIPS is that the NIPS alters the flow of network traffic. There are two types of NIPS: active response and inline. Architecturally, an active response NIPS is like the NIDS in Fig. 7.2; the difference is that the monitoring interface is read/write. The active response NIPS may “shoot down” malicious traffic via a variety of methods, including forging TCP RST segments to source or destination (or both), or sending ICMP port, host, or network unreachable to source.

An inline NIPS is “in line” with traffic, acting as a Layer 3–7 firewall by passing or allowing traffic, as shown in Fig. 7.3.

Note that a NIPS provides defense-in-depth protection in addition to a firewall; it is not typically used as a replacement. Also, a false positive by a NIPS is more damaging than one by a NIDS because legitimate traffic is denied, which may cause production problems. A NIPS usually has a smaller set of rules compared to a NIDS for this reason, and only the most trustworthy rules are used. A NIPS is not a replacement for a NIDS; many networks use both a NIDS and a NIPS.

Network IDS

Network-based intrusion detection systems (NIDS) are devices intelligently distributed within networks that passively inspect traffic traversing the devices on which they sit. NIDS can be hardware or software-based systems and, depending on the manufacturer of the system, can attach to various network mediums such as Ethernet, FDDI, and others. Oftentimes, NIDS have two network interfaces. One is used for listening to network conversations in promiscuous mode and the other is used for control and reporting.

With the advent of switching, which isolates unicast conversations to ingress and egress switch ports, network infrastructure vendors have devised port-mirroring techniques to replicate all network traffic to the NIDS. There are other means of supplying traffic to the IDS such as network taps. Cisco uses Switched Port Analyzer (SPAN) functionality to facilitate this capability on their network devices and, in some network equipment, includes NIDS components directly within the switch. We’ll discuss Cisco’s IDS products in the next chapter.

While there are many NIDS vendors, all systems tend to function in one of two ways; NIDS are either signature-based or anomaly-based systems. Both are mechanisms that separate benign traffic from its malicious brethren. Potential issues with NIDS include high-speed network data overload, tuning difficulties, encryption, and signature development lag time. We’ll cover how IDS work and the difficulties involved with them later in this section.

10 Network Intrusion Detection System: Scope and Limitations

NIDS sensors scan network packets at the router or host level, auditing data packets and logging any suspicious packets to a log file. Fig. e16.2 is an example of an NIDS. The data packets are captured by a sniffer program, which is a part of the IDS software package. The node on which the IDS software is enabled runs in promiscuous mode. In promiscuous mode, the NIDS node captures all of the data packets on the network as defined by the configuration script. NIDSs have become a critical component of network security management because the number of nodes on the Internet has grown exponentially over the past few years. Some common malicious attacks on networks are:

IP address spoofing

media access control (MAC) address spoofing

Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) cache poisoning

DNS name corruption

Network IDS

The NIDS derives its name from the fact that it monitors the entire network. More accurately, it monitors an entire network segment. Normally, a computer network interface card (NIC) operates in nonpromiscuous mode. In this mode of operation, only packets destined for the NICs specific media access control (MAC) address are forwarded up the stack for analysis. The NIDS must operate in promiscuous mode to monitor network traffic not destined for its own MAC address. In promiscuous mode, the NIDS can eavesdrop on all communications on the network segment. Operation in promiscuous mode is necessary to protect your network. However, in view of emerging privacy regulations, monitoring network communications is a responsibility that must be considered carefully.

In Figure 7.2, we see a network using three NIDS. The units have been placed on strategic network segments and can monitor network traffic for all devices on the segment. This configuration represents a standard perimeter security network topology where the screened subnets on the DMZ housing the public servers are protected by NIDS. When a public server is compromised on a screened subnet, the server can become a launching platform for additional exploits. Careful monitoring is necessary to prevent further damage.

The internal host systems inside the firewall are protected by an additional NIDS to mitigate exposure to internal compromise. The use of multiple NIDS within a network is an example of a defense-in-depth security architecture.

2.3.1 Network intrusion-detection systems

NIDS are placed at a strategic point or points within the network to monitor traffic to and from all devices on the network. It performs an analysis of passing traffic on the entire subnet, and matches the traffic that is passed on the subnets to the library of known attacks. Once an attack is identified, or abnormal behavior is sensed, the alert can be sent to the administrator. An example of an NIDS would be installing it on the subnet where firewalls are located in order to see if someone is trying to break into the firewall. Ideally one would scan all inbound and outbound traffic, however doing so might create a bottleneck that would impair the overall speed of the network.

Traffic Monitoring

Network-based IDSs typically monitor network packets for signs of reconnaissance, exploits, DoS attacks, and malware. They have strengths to complement host-based IDSs: Network-based IDSs can see traffic for a population of hosts; they can recognize patterns shared by multiple hosts; and they have the potential to see attacks before they reach the hosts.

IDSs are placed in various locations for different views, as shown in Figure 3.6. An IDS outside a firewall is useful for learning about malicious activities on the Internet. An IDS in the DMZ will see attacks originating from the Internet that are able to get through the outer firewall to public servers. Lastly, an IDS in the private network is necessary to detect any attacks that are able to successfully penetrate perimeter security.

11. Network-based Intrusion Prevention Systems

NIDS are designed to passively monitor traffic and raise alarms when suspicious traffic is detected, whereas network-based intrusion prevention systems (NIPS) are designed to go one step further and actually try to prevent the attack from succeeding. This is typically achieved by inserting the NIPS device inline with the traffic it is monitoring. Each network packet is inspected and only passed if it does not trigger some sort of alert based on a signature match or anomaly threshold. Suspicious packets are discarded and an alert is generated.

The ability to intervene and stop known attacks, in contrast to the passive monitoring of NIDS, is the greatest benefit of NIPS. However, NIPS suffers from the same drawbacks and limitations as discussed for NIDS, such as heavy reliance on static signatures, inability to examine encrypted traffic, and difficulties with very high network speeds. In addition, false alarms are much more significant due to the fact that the NIPS may discard that traffic even though it is not really malicious. If the destination system is business or mission critical, this action could have significant negative impact on the functioning of the system. Thus, great care must be taken to tune the NIPS during a training period where there is no packet discard before allowing it to begin blocking any detected, malicious traffic.